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SINGAPORE'S NEW AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS WITH




W THIN THE PAST two years alone, the city-state of Singa-
pore has signed new and highly liberalized air services
agreements with both the European Union ("E.U.") and the
United Kingdom ("U.K"). The cumulative impact of both
agreements sets a dramatic new standard for liberalized bilateral
air services agreements, heralding what possibly could be the
first fully open aviation market established between "united Eu-
rope" and an Asian country. With the simultaneous occurrence
of the liberalized deal between the E.U. and the United States,
the Singapore agreements will create a powerful impetus for
other countries-particularly in the Asian region-to pursue
similar accords with the E.U. and the United States. Yet, among
themselves, the Asian countries are still years away from imple-
menting an effective multilateral regime for air traffic services,
much less a common aviation market. Meanwhile, the need for
greater opening up within Asia to counter external competitive
pressures from E.U. and U.S. carriers is fast becoming evident.
II. THE SINGAPORE-E.U. AGREEMENT
A. COMMUNITY CARRIER CLAUSE BUT No
ADDITIONAL CAPACITY
On June 9, 2006, Singapore became the first Asian country to
sign a new "horizontal" aviation agreement with the E.U.1 Sin-
gapore earlier initialed the agreement in 2005, pursuant to the
* L.L.B. (National University of Singapore), L.L.M., J.S.D. (Yale), Associate
Professor and Vice-Dean, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore.
Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the
Republic of Singapore on Certain Aspects of Air Services, June 9, 2006, 2006 O.J.
(L 243) 22 [hereinafter Singapore-E.U. Agreement].
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European Commission's so-called "horizontal mandate" to re-
negotiate air services agreements with third countries.2 This
mandate had, in turn, been the result of the landmark decision
of the European Court of Justice in November 2002 that effec-
tively outlawed the standard designation clauses found in the
individual E.U. member states' bilateral agreements with third
states.8 The clauses had restricted traffic rights to airlines sub-
stantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of a par-
ticular member state and its third state partners, thereby
violating provisions of European community law which guaran-
teed equal utilization of those rights by all carriers in the E.U.4
With the signing of the "horizontal" agreement, Singapore
joins a host of other countries' that allow any E.U. airline to fly
2 See Press Release, Eur. Union Council of Transp. Ministers, 2515th Council
Meeting - Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (June 5, 2003), http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/ docs/pressData/en /trans/ 76064.
pdf. See also Henri Wassenbergh, 5June 2003, A Historic Decision by the EU Council
of Transport Ministers, 28 AIR & SPACE L. 214, 214 (2003).
3 Case C466/98, Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9427; Case C-
467/98, Comm'n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9519; Case C-468/98, Comm'n v.
Sweden, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9575; Case C-469/98, Comm'n v. Finland, 2002 E.C.R. I-
9627; Case C-471/98, Comm'n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9681; Case C-472/98,
Comm'n v. Luxembourg, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9741; Case C-475/98, Comm'n v. Austria,
2002 E.C.R. 1-9797; Case C-476/98, Comm'n v. Germany, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9855. For
detailed analyses of the ECJ decisions, see, e.g., Martin Bartlik, The 'Open-Skies'
Decision of the European Court of Justice: The Advent of a New Era?, XXVIII ANNALS
AIR & SPACE L. 357 (2003); H.S. RutgerJan toe Laer, The ECJDecisions: 'Blessing in
Disguise'?, 31 AIR & SPACE L. 19, 25-26 (2006); Berry White, Beginning of a Rede-
fined Industry: How the European Court ofJustice's Decision in the Open Skies Case Could
Change the Global Aviation Industry, 29 TRANsp. L.J. 267, 273-75 (2002).
4 In particular, the existing bilateral agreements limited community carriers'
freedom of establishment under Art. 43 (formerly 52) of the European Commu-
nity Treaty. See Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 43, Nov. 10,
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3.
5 By the end of November 2007, thirty-one countries had either signed or ini-
tialed agreements with the E.U. recognizing community designation. See Bilat-
eral ASA Brought into Legal Conformity since ECJ Judgments on 5 November
2002, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-portal/in ternational/pillars/doc/asa_
table.pdf [hereinafter Table of Countries]. These countries are Albania, Arme-
nia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, FYR Mac-
edonia, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Moldova,
Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Romania,
Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the
United States, Uruguay, and Vietnam (note that Bulgaria and Romania joined
the E.U. on January 1, 2007). Id. In Asia and the Pacific, agreements with the
following countries have already been signed: Chile (Oct. 6, 2005), Singapore
(June 9, 2006), New Zealand (June 21, 2006), Maldives (Sept. 21, 2006), Malaysia
(Mar. 22, 2007), the United States (Apr. 30, 2007), Kyrgyzstan (June 1, 2007) and
the United Arab Emirates (Nov. 30, 2007). Air Transport Portal of the European
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between any point in the E.U. and that country's territories.
This is made possible through the third states' recognition of
the "community carrier" designation clause that replaces the
traditional nationality clause.6 At the same time, one must re-
member that the new "horizontal" agreements create no new or
additional rights for carriers from both sides.' The existing
rights found in the prevailing bilateral agreements between indi-
vidual E.U. member states and third states continue to govern
market capacity on the relevant routes. Hence, for as long as
capacity under an existing bilateral agreement is finite, the E.U.
carriers will have to share the available capacity among them-
selves.8 This is already the subject of legislation in the E.U., with
Regulation 847/2004 expected to oversee the question of trans-
parent and non-discriminatory allocation of limited market ca-
pacity among community carriers.9
The impact of the "horizontal" agreements is thus negligible
for now, except where existing capacity is either unlimited or
under-utilized. Ultimately, unless the E.U. can persuade third
states to tear up their entire bundle of individual bilateral agree-
ments and to re-negotiate an increase in capacity with Europe as
a whole, the status quo is likely to prevail for some time. In ef-
fect, the "horizontal" agreements are mere palliatives awaiting a
more ambitious goal-the negotiation of "open skies" or single
market agreements promising highly liberalized or totally un-
limited capacity between a unified Europe and individual third
states. On this point, the European Commission appears to
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-portal/international/pillars/
developments/index-en.htm. Fifty-three other countries have recognized com-
munity designation in bilateral agreements with at least one E.U. member state.
Table of Countries, supra. In total, 591 bilateral agreements have effectively been
updated with community designation, 484 of them through the "horizontal"
agreement mechanism. Id.
6 For an example of such a clause, see Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note
1, art. 2.
7 Peter Van Fenema, EU Horizontal Agreements: Community Designation and the
'Free Rider' Clause, 31 AIR & SPACE L. 172, 178 (2006).
8 Id. at 178 n.15. However, existing rights "that are ... being exercised.., are
grandfathered" and need not be redistributed; "[o]nly unused or additional ca-
pacity" will be subject to re-distribution. Id.
9 See Regulation 847/2004 of Apr. 29, 2004, on the negotiation and implemen-
tation of air services agreements between member states and third countries.
Commission Regulation 847/2004, art. 5, 2004 0.J. (L 157) 7. For a review of
what the Regulation entails in relation to bringing existing bilateral agreements
in line with European Community law, see Richard Smithies, Regulatory Conver-
gence - Extending the Reach of EU Aviation Law, 72J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 6-8 (2007).
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have won a tactical advantage-the successful completion of the
new E.U.-U.S. agreement in 2007 (effective March 30, 2008) will
add new pressure to states that are still resisting European over-
tures to open up their aviation markets.1"
In this regard, the thirty or so states that have initialed or
signed the "horizontal" agreements seem to have signified their
full willingness to pursue more open deals with the E.U. Others,
however, have been more cautious-Thailand, Indonesia, and
South Korea, for instance, have not signed "horizontal" agree-
ments, but instead have negotiated to insert "community car-
rier" designation clauses when revising their existing bilateral
agreements with certain E.U. member states.11 Hence, South
Korea, in exchange for an extra designation for its second car-
rier-Asiana Airlines-to fly the Seoul-Paris route, has accepted
"community carrier" designation in its revised bilateral agree-
ment with France. 1
2
Crucially, however, Korea has reportedly managed to limit the
E.U.-through that agreement with France-to only two com-
munity carriers on the Seoul-Paris route.1 3 The Korean govern-
ment's insistence on two carriers for each side was partly a result
of lobbying by the national flag carrier, Korean Air, which saw
unlimited community designation as a threat to Korean carri-
ers. 4 Asiana, however, was keen to inaugurate Seoul-Paris
flights immediately, and did not think that other E.U. carriers
would rush into the route even if Korea accepted the clause.'
5
10 See Council Decision 2007/2339/EC, 2007 OJ. (L 134) 1. For a review of
the issues, see Ruwantissa Abeyratne, US/EU Open Skies Agreement-Some Issues, 72
J. AIR L. & COM. 21, 27-32 (2007).
11 See Table of Countries, supra note 5.
12 Korean Air, Asiana at Odds Over Paris Route, CHOSUN ILBO, Jan. 18, 2007,
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200701/200701180032.html;
S. Korea, France Begin Talks for Increased Seoul-Paris Flights, ABC MONEY, Jan. 23,
2007, http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/2320079933.htm.
13 See More Convenient Trip From Seoul to Paris, Korean Ministry of Construction
and Transportation, Jan. 26, 2007, http://web2.moct.go.kr/EngHome/index.jsp.
14 Korean Air, Asiana at Odds Over Paris Route, supra note 12.
15 See id. For a long time, France resisted Asiana's entry given that it had only
one carrier (Air France), as opposed to Korea's two. The prevailing understand-
ing was that a second entrant would be permitted once the annual passenger flow
between the two countries hit 400,000. Id. Korean Air's position was that Korea
could wait for that target to be reached (given recent steady growth in passenger
traffic), and that there was no need to accept the E.U.'s community clause de-
mand in order to trigger the second designation. Id. Korean Air's stand was thus
dictated not so much by potential competition with E.U. carriers, but immediate
competition from Asiana. See id. Asiana was less opposed to the clause as it de-
sired quicker entry into the route. Id.
354
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Regardless, the curious result is that any community carriers
technically can be designated by France for the route, but no
more than two may be designated at any given point in time!
This means that only one E.U. carrier (apart from Air France)
can be designated for the route.
The deal appears to strengthen the Korean government's po-
sition in negotiating any future, single aviation market deal with
the E.U. By not giving in (at least at the initial stage) to a "hori-
zontal" agreement, there might be greater negotiating leverage
in the future by way of extracting more E.U. "hard rights" con-
cessions in exchange for unlimited community designations.16
For now, the deal is a classic example of a bilateral agreement
that fails to conform to the European Commission's strict insis-
tence on access for all community carriers. 17 Notwithstanding
this insistence, the Commission can still exempt and approve
such agreements as long as they do not "harm the object and
purpose of the Community common transport policy."' 8 This
provides a procedure for the Commission and member states to
reach what are known as "comitology" decisions on such
agreements.19
As far as the Korea-France agreement is concerned, it is diffi-
cult to imagine how a provision that limits the number of com-
munity carriers operating on the Seoul-Paris route still can be
consistent with the spirit of freedom of establishment for all car-
riers. In effect, France can choose to designate only one other
E.U. carrier to enjoy the additional capacity (three to four extra
flights per week) on the route.2 ° Yet, it is equally arguable that
no community carrier is being discriminated against on grounds
16 Thailand is similarly working on a "model" clause for insertion into revisions
to individual bilateral agreements with E.U. member states. Air Transport Portal
of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-portal/inter
national/pillars/developments/2006_en.htm.
17 As laid out in Commission Regulation 847/2004, supra note 9. The majority
of new bilateral agreements signed since November 2002 do not appear to con-
form to the Commission's requirements. See Stephen Dolan, EC Aviation Scene, 29
AIR & SPACE L. 415, 437-38 (2004).
18 Commission Regulation 847/2004, supra note 9, 4 3. See also Commission
Regulation 847/2004, supra note 9, arts. 1-4.
19 Stephen Dolan, EC Aviation Scene (No. 2:2005), 30 AIR & SPACE L. 353,
364-65 (2005).
20 The new agreement increased the number of weekly flights on the Seoul-
Paris route from the prevailing seven for carriers from each side, to eleven.
Asiana Airlines Allowed to Fly Seoul-Paris Route, KOREA.NET, Jan. 25, 2007, http://
www.korea.net/News/News/Newsview.asp?serialno=200701250 0 4. Asiana is
likely to obtain the extra flights on the Korean side.
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of nationality. Indeed, France (in accordance with Regulation
847/2004) can choose to designate any other E.U. carrier to en-
joy the additional capacity. The real problem is the restricted
capacity on the route: from a commercial viability angle, the ad-
ditional three or four flights a week can be operated only realis-
tically by one other carrier.2
Be that as it may, the E.U. member states remain obliged to
negotiate the insertion of "community carrier" clauses in any
new or revised bilateral agreements with third states in the ab-
sence of over-arching "horizontal" agreements with those states.
As shown by the Korean case, such efforts will not always be
straightforward since third states may see little incentive to in-
corporate community designation into their individual bilateral
agreements. 2 2 Somewhat ironically, member states like France
are more likely to be successful in persuading third states to
agree (bilaterally) to community designation, because they can
offer "hard" rights such as increased capacity for the third states'
carriers. 23 Even then, the impact of a bilaterally-inserted "com-
munity carrier" clause is always restricted because it applies only
to routes between two particular states. Thus, any number of
E.U. carriers can lobby to mount flights between (only) France
and South Korea, though they still would be subject to the avail-
able rights and capacity on those routes.
In the short term, the only way to drastically expand capacity
to a third state market is for individual E.U. member states to
enter into highly liberalized bilateral agreements with that third
state. At the same time, the third state must be persuaded to
recognize "community carrier" designation, whether by way of a
"horizontal" agreement with the European Commission or re-
vised bilateral agreements with those particular E.U. member
states. Only then will the extra capacity afforded on the relevant
routes be available for use by all community carriers. Third
states prepared to do both these steps are likely to be those hav-
ing strong airlines (resulting in a less-protectionist attitude and
less concern about affecting the "balance" between Community
21 It would be different if capacity had been doubled or tripled, and Korea still
insisted on limiting the number of E.U. carriers to two.
22 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Liberalizing Aviation in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Impact of
the EU Horizontal Mandate, 31 AIR & SPACE L. 432, 448 (2006) ("[1]ncreased access
may not be [an] adequate incentive[ ] if the relevant routes already face over-
capacity or if third country carriers are not interested" in mounting more flights,
possibly for lack of aircraft or other capacity.) Id.
23 Van Fenema, supra note 7, at 184.
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and home carriers), a relatively small but open market, and/or a
desire to establish aviation hubs. Such is the case with Singa-
pore and is precisely the context within which the highly liberal-
ized Singapore-U.K bilateral agreement was reached in
November 2007. Before discussing that agreement, however,
other key features of the Singapore-E.U. "horizontal" agreement
will be highlighted.
B. No "FREE RIDERS"
The last paragraph of the preamble to the Singapore-E.U.
agreement is significant. The parties note that "it is not a pur-
pose of the European Community in this Agreement to increase
the total volume of air traffic between the European Community
and Singapore, to affect the balance between Community air
carriers and air carriers of Singapore, or to prevail over the in-
terpretation of the provisions of existing bilateral air service
agreements concerning traffic rights. '24 This familiar "balance"
clause-found in the "horizontal" agreements with other third
states as well-confirms the understanding that such agree-
ments do not affect the prevailing bilateral provisions governing
traffic rights and capacity.
What is interesting about the Singapore-E.U. "horizontal"
agreement is the specific insertion of the so-called "free rider"
clause (more accurately, the anti-"free rider" clause) within Arti-
cle 2, the main provision on designation, authorization, and rev-
25
ocation. Accepting the community designation clause without
conditions would have forced a third state like Singapore to ac-
cept any one E.U. state's designations of carriers from other
E.U. states, some of whom have either a restrictive or no bilat-
eral relationship with Singapore.26
To protect against such situations, Singapore has negotiated
the right to refuse, revoke, suspend, or limit the operating au-
thorization or technical permission of an air carrier designated
by any E.U. member state where
it can be demonstrated that by exercising traffic rights under this
Agreement on a route that includes a point in another Member
State, including the operation of a service which is marketed as,
24 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble 8.
25 Other states whose "horizontal" agreements contain such clauses include
Chile, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. See Van
Fenema, supra note 7, at 182 n.20. It has been estimated that thirty percent of
"horizontal" agreements contain such clauses. Id. at 186.
26 Tan, supra note 22, at 448 n.67.
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or otherwise constitutes a through service, the air carrier would
in effect be circumventing restrictions on traffic rights imposed
by an agreement between Singapore and that other Member
State.27
Similarly, Singapore can do the same with respect to a desig-
nated air carrier which
holds an air operator's certificate issued by a Member State and
there is no bilateral air services agreement between Singapore
and that Member State and it can be demonstrated that the nec-
essary traffic rights to conduct the proposed operation are not
reciprocally available to the designated air carrier(s) of
Singapore.28
What all this amounts to can be illustrated by the following
examples. Under the current terms of the Singapore-France bi-
lateral agreement, Air France ("AF") operates a daily flight
(seven times weekly) between Paris and Singapore, while Singa-
pore Airlines ("SQ") flies ten times weekly between the two cit-
ies. 29 Capacity is thus restricted, similar to the France-Korea
agreement. With the signing of the Singapore-E.U. "horizontal"
agreement, AF could now possibly be designated by the U.K. au-
thorities to fly between the U.K. and Singapore.
At the same time, with the single European aviation market in
full operation and the impending effect of the liberal Singa-
pore-U.K. agreement, AF could technically operate an unlimited
number of Paris-London and London-Singapore services that
are either marketed as, or otherwise constitute, a through ser-
vice. Such operations could be mounted by way of one-stop,
same-plane services, or change-of-gauge operations at U.K. air-
ports, bearing a single flight code. Either way, AF would be cir-
cumventing traffic rights restrictions imposed by the Singapore-
France agreement.30 The other scenario is equally interesting-
the Slovenian carrier, Adria, could conceivably be designated by
the U.K. authorities to fly the London-Singapore route. How-
27 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2, 4(a) (v).
28 Id. art. 2, 1 4(a) (vi). Singapore has bilateral air services agreements with all
the E.U. member states (with varying degrees of openness/restrictiveness), save
for Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia. See id. Annex I (listing
countries with bilateral air services agreements with Singapore).
29 Originally, there were also seven weekly SQ flights. The additional three
flights were only added in October 2007.
30 Likewise, the anti-"free rider" clause would cover, for example, an Athens-
London and London-Singapore operation mounted by Air France, given that the
Singapore-Greece agreement is also a restrictive one.
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ever, with no air services agreement in existence between Singa-
pore and Slovenia, a Singapore carrier would have no reciprocal
rights to fly to the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana.3 1
The anti-"free rider" clauses thus permit a third state like Sin-
gapore to preserve the balance of aero-political relations with
certain E.U. states, thereby denying the possibility of "back
door" entry via the "horizontal" agreement. While such conces-
sions would be anathema to the European Commission-in that
they permit third states to discriminate and do exactly what the
"horizontal" agreements seek to proscribe-they are unavoida-
ble to obtain practicably the co-operation of third states. 32 In-
deed, the Singapore agreement makes it absolutely clear that
while Singapore shall not discriminate between air carriers of
E.U. member states on grounds of nationality, this obligation
does not prejudice Singapore's rights under the "free rider"
clauses.33 It is also significant that such clauses are found not
only in "horizontal" agreements, but also have made their way
into recent bilateral agreements signed between individual E.U.
member states and third states. 4 Notably, Singapore inserted
these same clauses into its new bilateral agreement with the
U.K. 5
More straightforward is Article 2's restatement of the now-fa-
miliar requirement governing E.U. member state designations.
An air carrier designated by member states must be established
"in the territory of the designating Member State and ha ve] a
valid operating license from a Member State in accordance with
Community law."' 36 The member state responsible for issuing
the air operator's certificate (which need not be the designating
member state) must exercise and maintain effective regulatory
31 An "open skies" agreement between the two countries has actually been ne-
gotiated and initialed, but is still awaiting ratification on the Slovenian side.
32 Van Fenema, supra note 7, at 183, 185.
33 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2, 5.
34 Van Fenema, supra note 7, at 185 (giving the example of the U.K-New Zea-
land bilateral agreement of July 2005, which repeats verbatim the "free rider"
clauses in the New Zealand-E.U. "horizontal" agreement).
35 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, art.
5(1) (a) (v)-(vi), Oct. 2, 2007 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Singapore-
U.K. OSA]. See infra note 49.
36 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2, 1 3(a) (i). This is in accor-
dance with Council Regulation (EEC) 2407/92 of July 23, 1992 (the Licensing
Regulation), which forms part of the requirements laid down following the
"Third Package" of liberalizations in the early 1990s. Council Regulation 2407/
92, 1992 OJ. (L 240) 1.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
control (for example, safety oversight) over the carrier, with the
"relevant aeronautical authority . . . clearly identified in the
designation." 7
In addition, the carrier must have "its principal place of busi-
ness in the territory of the Member State" issuing the valid oper-
ating license.3 Further, the carrier must be "owned directly or
through majority ownership and ... [be] effectively controlled
by [E.U.] Member States and/or [their] nationals.""9 For Singa-
pore-designated carriers, the Agreement requires that "Singa-
pore ha[ve] and maintain[ ] effective regulatory control of the
air carrier,' '40 and that the carrier's "principal place of business
[be] in Singapore."41 Any breach of the above provisions, in-
cluding those pertaining to "free riding," will entitle the other
party to "refuse, revoke, suspend[,] or limit the operating
authorisation or technical permissions" of the relevant air
carriers.42
Interesting here is the entrenchment of the "effective regula-
tory control" test. 3 As between Singapore and the E.U., effec-
tive control over a carrier now includes regulatory (for example,
safety and security oversight) functions, which are to be exer-
cised on the E.U. end by the member state issuing the air opera-
tor's certificate.44 At the same time, there is still an effective
economic control requirement, although such control (together
with majority ownership) can reside with any E.U. member
state(s) and/or their nationals.45
From Singapore's perspective, however, where ownership and
economic control lie is not an issue. For the purposes of Singa-
pore-E.U. aviation relations, a Singapore-designated carrier may
be owned (in any shareholding proportion) and controlled by
37 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2, 3(a) (ii). Note also that
where the designating member state differs from the member state responsible
for regulatory control (the second state), Singapore's rights under the safety pro-
visions that apply to the designating member state also apply to the second state
with respect to the adoption, exercise, or maintenance of safety standards and in
respect of the operating authorization of the carrier. See id. art. 3, 2.
38 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2, 3(a) (iii).
39 Id. art. 2, 3(a) (iv). This extends to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and
Switzerland and/or their nationals. Id. Annex III.
40 Id. art 2, 3(b)(i).
41 Id. art. 2, 3(b)(ii).
42 Id. art. 2, 4.
43 Id. art. 2, 3(a)(ii).
44 Id.
45 This includes the Annex III countries. See id. art. 2, 3(a) (ii), (iv).
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foreign parties, as long as Singapore is the principal place of
business and maintains effective regulatory control over it. In
other words, there does not need to be any ownership or eco-
nomic control by Singaporean interests. This represents one of
the farthest departures from the traditional "substantial owner-
ship and effective control" requirement and is also a feature in
Singapore's recent bilateral agreements with Greece and the
U.K 46 With other relatively progressive countries, however, the
"effective control" (meaning economic control) test persists,
though the "substantial ownership" prong has been replaced
with a place of incorporation and principal place of business
criterion .
In other respects, the "horizontal" agreement provides that
Singapore-designated carriers are subject to Community law in
relation to tariffs charged for carriage wholly within the E.U.48
This provision is meant to regulate intra-E.U. carriage per-
formed by Singapore-designated carriers such as fifth freedom
flights. For Singapore Airlines, this would apply to its Milan-Bar-
celona operation which currently is its only fifth freedom opera-
tion within Europe. The carrier used to ply the Zurich-
Manchester route on a fifth freedom basis, but that has been
discontinued recently. It has various other fifth freedom rights
under existing bilateral agreements with individual E.U. states,
but these are not being exercised currently.
46 The clause resembles the "principal place of business and strong links to
designating state" model clause proposed in 2003 by the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization ("ICAO"). See Yu-Chun Chang, George Williams & Chia-Jui
Hsu, The Evolution of Airline Ownership and Control Provisions, 10 J. AIR TRANSP.
MGMT. 161, 166-67 (2004) (reproducing art. X of the Model Clause from the
Fifth ICAO Worldwide Air Transport Conference in Table 5). The ICAO clause
is meant precisely to replace effective commercial control with effective regula-
tory control.
47 See the Singapore bilateral air services agreement with the United Arab
Emirates (2004) and Bahrain (2005), as well as the 2001 Multilateral Agreement
on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation, to which Brunei, Chile,
New Zealand, Singapore, the United States, Samoa, Tonga, and the Cook Islands
are parties. Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Transp., Singapore and UAE
Formalise Open Skies, (Feb. 26, 2004), http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/p-04_02_26.
htm; Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Transp., Singapore and Bahrain Sign
Open Skies Agreement, (Apr. 7, 2005), http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/p_05047.
htm; Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transpor-
tation, May 1, 2001, State Dep't No. 02-13, 2001 WL 1783630 [hereinafter
MALLAT].
48 Singapore-E.U. Agreement, supra note 1, art. 4.
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III. THE SINGAPORE-U.K. AGREEMENT
Singapore's new deal with the U.K. must be placed within the
context of the Singapore-E.U. "horizontal" agreement. On No-
vember 21, 2007, Singapore and the U.K signed a landmark
Open Skies Agreement (Singapore-U.K OSA) that removes all
restrictions on passenger and all-cargo air services operated by
Singapore- and U.K-designated carriers.4 9 The agreement takes
full effect on March 30, 2008, superseding the 1971 bilateral air
services agreement between the two countries.50 What is revolu-
tionary about this new agreement is that it goes well beyond con-
ventional "open skies" agreements that provide unlimited third/
fourth freedom access, and accords unlimited fifth, seventh, and
even eighth and ninth freedom (i.e. "cabotage") rights for carri-
ers from both sides.
51
Hence, from March 30, 2008, Singapore-designated carriers
such as Singapore Airlines ("SIA") would be permitted to oper-
ate trans-Atlantic flights from London's Heathrow airport to
New York's John F. Kennedy ("JFK") airport, whether in the
form of fifth or seventh freedom operations. A fifth freedom
operation between Heathrow and JFK (with flights originating
from and terminating in Singapore) had long been coveted
by-but denied to-SIA.52 The OSA now goes beyond that, and
actually accords seventh freedom operations that do not necessi-
tate a Singapore-U.K or U.K-Singapore leg. With that, SIA can
establish a "hubbing" operation at Heathrow (or at any U.K air-
port) if it wants to. This allows it to station aircraft to connect
any point in the U.K with any point in the United States without
having to include Singapore as part of the itinerary. At the same
49 Press Release, Singapore Ministry of Transp., Singapore and the United
Kingdom Conclude Landmark Open Skies Agreement (Oct. 3, 2007), http://
app.mot.gov.sg/data/pr_0710 03.htm. The Singapore-U.K. OSA had been con-
cluded by negotiators from both sides a month earlier, on October 2, 2007, which
was also the date when an accompanying Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU") took effect. Id.
50 Id.
51 These details are contained in the MOU between the two countries. Id.
While the MOU is a confidential document, the description of the unlimited
freedoms was released by the Singapore Ministry of Transport. See id. See also
S'pore, Britain Sign Open Skies Agreement, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 22, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 23077767; Ven Sreenivasan, Skies Open for SIA Flights to
Britain and Beyond, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 4, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
19390892.
52 SIA had been lobbying for the route since the 1980s. See Ven Sreenivasan,
OSA: The Right Niche Will Pay Off for SIA, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 5, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 19464606.
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time, a Singapore carrier can now mount and pick up traffic on
any number of intra-U.KI flights, either in the form of eighth
freedom operations connecting to and from Singapore (e.g.,
Singapore-Heathrow-Edinburgh), or stand-alone domestic
flights (e.g., London Gatwick to Manchester).
The far-reaching implications of the Singapore-U.K OSA
caught aviation observers by surprise.53 What led to the sudden
turn-around on the part of the U.K. government, long known
for protecting its carriers' dominance at Heathrow (particularly
British Airways)? Why, after denying SIA's long campaign for
fifth freedom access to JFK, had the U.K. government suddenly
relented, in fact going beyond to accord both seventh freedom
and cabotage rights? The answers, of course, lie in develop-
ments and realities extraneous to the OSA.
First, the effective date of March 30, 2008, is no coincidence.
That is the very date on which the E.U.-U.S. agreement starts to
apply, allowing any number of E.U. (and U.S.) carriers to con-
nect any point in the E.U. with any point in the United States. 54
Heathrow will henceforth be thrown open (subject to the availa-
bility of slots, as discussed below) to a multitude of E.U. and U.S.
carriers for flights to and from the United States. 55 This will in-
crease the number of potential carriers on the lucrative
Heathrow-JFK route well beyond the incumbent quartet of Brit-
ish Airways, Virgin Atlantic, United Airlines and American Air-
lines.5 6 The U.K. government must have recognized that it no
longer made sense to block SIA's requests for trans-Atlantic ac-
cess to JFK, now that carriers from the United States and the
entire E.U. could operate out of Heathrow.
53 Id.
54 See Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-Eur. Union, Apr. 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470.
The E.U.-U.S. agreement is truly liberal as far as multiple designation is con-
cerned, and any number of carriers on both sides may connect any point in the
E.U. with another in the United States. In contrast, the Korea-France situation
contains a "community carrier" clause that is effectively qualified by a quota on
the number of E.U. carriers allowed. More Convenient Trip From Seoul to Paris,
supra note 13.
55 Air France, for instance, has already announced flights from Heathrow,
Manchester, and Edinburgh to Los Angeles (with code-shared flights on Delta
Air Lines to New York, Atlanta, and Cincinnati). See Air France, Direct Flights to
the USA, http://www.airfrance.co.uk/ (click on "Fly Non-Stop to the USA"
banner).
56 Limited fifth freedom flights on the route are operated by Air India and
Kuwait Airways. See Something to Declare, INDEP. (London), May 15, 2004.
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Second, and more importantly, the victory for SIA is clearly a
hollow one. Heathrow remains extremely slot-constrained, and
SIA (and other E.U. carriers for that matter) would find it
hugely difficult and expensive to obtain ready slots for opera-
tions to and from the United States, whether in addition to, or
as part of, its current thrice-daily operations from Singapore."
Unless it wants to spend millions of pounds buying several pairs
of daily slots, 58 there is no clear advantage for SIA to begin oper-
ations out of Heathrow to the United States. Even a daily flight
to JFK would not make much commercial sense for SIA in the
competition for business travelers, given that it would be pitted
against the likes of British Airways and American Airlines with
their numerous daily flights from Heathrow.59
Given these actual constraints for Singapore carriers, the U.K.
government must have reasoned that it (and British carriers)
had little to lose in awarding a generous package to Singapore.
In exchange, the U.K. obtained reciprocal rights to conduct un-
limited fifth and seventh freedom (hubbing) operations out of
Singapore (as well as cabotage, though this is meaningless in the
Singapore context). Fifth and seventh freedom privileges, how-
ever, remain entirely dependent on a third state agreeing to the
operation. Any U.K. (or E.U.) carrier wishing to operate such
flights to third state Asia-Pacific destinations out of Singapore
would have to obtain the consent of the relevant third states.
Similarly, the only reason Singaporean carriers can conceive of
mounting unlimited fifth freedom flights out of the U.K. to the
United States is because Singapore already has an "open skies"
agreement with the latter allowing for such operations.6"
57 SIA has three daily flights to Heathrow using 747s and is using the larger
A380 starting in the first quarter of 2008. Heathrow Airport News, Singapore
Airlines Plans A380 Heathrow Flights from March, (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.
uk-airport-news.info/heathrow-airport-news-131107b.htm.
58 In December 2007, the Italian carrier Alitalia reportedly sold several pairs of
slots at Heathrow for a total of C92 million (Y67 million or US$135 million), with
one pair going for a record price of more than C41 million (30 million or
US$59 million). See Kevin Done, Alitalia Sells Heathrow Slots, FIN. TIMES (Europe),
Dec. 27, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25448625.
59 British Airways has eight daily flights, American has six, while Virgin has
four. United withdrew from the route in October 2006, citing unprofitability,
and has since sold its slots to Delta. See Kevin Done, UAL Drops London to New York
Flights, FIN. TIMES (Europe), July 29, 2006.
60 Singapore was the first Asian country to sign an "open skies" agreement with
the United States (in 1997). The Skies Open Up, AsIAN TRADE, Apr. 16, 1997, http:/
/web.archive.org/web/20060216043221 /http://www.aftaonline.com/aol+arch
ives/industry/Travel+97.htm. This agreement is now superseded by the MALIAT
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IV. THE AGREEMENTS IN THE GLOBAL
AERO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
Looking ahead, the Singapore-U.K. agreement will portend
deeply significant aviation developments, particularly in the
Asian region. To begin, there is no reason why the U.K. (or for
that matter, other E.U. countries, acting individually for now)
would not extend the same Singapore-type privileges to other
countries in the region such as Australia, Malaysia, and Thai-
land, in exchange for reciprocal rights. Once that happens, the U.K.
(and other E.U.) carriers will then be able to exercise their fifth
and seventh freedom privileges out of Singapore (or any other
hub airport in the region) to build an extensive intra-Asian net-
work. For Singapore, this would mean that its current preferred
status accorded by the U.K. will not last long. Other Asian carri-
ers will soon have the same set of privileges to fly trans-Atlantic
from the U.K. to the U.S., assuming their countries have "open
skies" agreements with the U.S.61 For the U.K. (and the rest of
the E.U.), this would be the first step towards creating a fully
liberal aviation market with selected Asian countries.
What would all this mean for individual Asian carriers, apart
from being able to fly from or through the U.K. (and soon
enough, the entire E.U.) to the United States? It comes back to
the point made previously by this author, that the ultimate, criti-
cal step must be for the Asian countries to liberalize among them-
selves.62 If this is not done, Asian carriers will discover that the
E.U. carriers could soon be operating multiple hubs not only in
Europe, but in various Asian cities as well. For instance, British
Airways could conceivably operate an unlimited number of fifth
and seventh freedom flights out of Singapore to cities in Austra-
lia, New Zealand, and Indonesia once these countries sign lib-
eral deals with the U.K. This would be on top of British Airways'
ability to launch connecting flights from Singapore to any E.U.
destination (and not just U.K. cities). In effect, British Airways
could technically gain the ability to operate a hub-and-spokes
model out of Singapore and to replicate (at least in part) SLA's
highly successful sixth freedom network out of the latter's own
home turf. If the ability of all other E.U. carriers to do just this
is added, and other major cities such as Bangkok and Seoul be-
multilateral agreement to which both countries are parties. See MALIAT, supra
note 47, art. 15.
61 This also assumes the availability of slots at Heathrow.
62 Tan, supra note 22, at 453.
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come potential hubs, too, the competitive pressure for Asian
carriers will be significant.
For their part, the Asian carriers will find themselves-at
best-able to operate hubs in Europe if their countries conclude
open aviation agreements with the E.U. Even then, these carri-
ers will only be able to fly to those countries (such as the United
States) with whom their own countries have "open skies" agree-
ments. Crucially, the Asian carriers will not be able to operate
multiple hubs in their own backyard, that is, within the Asian
region. This is because Asian countries, with few exceptions,
have not been prepared to accord generous fifth and seventh
freedom rights to one another.63 Within the Asia-Pacific region,
multilateral initiatives such as MALIAT have stalled, given the
small number of member states.64 On the bilateral front, relaxa-
tions have tended to be modest, typically taking the form of in-
creased or unlimited third/fourth freedom flights.65 Fifth
freedom rights are jealously guarded, while seventh freedom
rights are virtually unheard of.66 Ownership and control rules
remain highly restrictive, with most countries still applying the
"substantial ownership and effective control" requirement on
each other.67
With the possible conclusion of an open aviation agreement
between Singapore and the entire E.U., SIA may be able to fly
from Singapore to an unlimited number of destinations within
the E.U., and to fly from any of these cities to any point in the
United States, whether as fifth or seventh freedom operations.
However, SIA would not be able to mount similar operations
from Bangkok or Hong Kong or Mumbai. Hence, for SIA, Sin-
gapore-London-U.S. or even Singapore-Paris-U.S. would be per-
missible, but not Hong Kong-London-U.S. or Bangkok-Paris-
U.S. In contrast, British Airways could possibly mount a Paris-
Bangkok-Singapore operation, and even fully use Paris, Bang-
kok, and Singapore as seventh freedom hubs. There is thus a
clear prospect of unequal market penetration. Put another way,
63 Id. at 449.
64 The main fear is MALIAT's provision for unrestricted fifth freedom rights,
and the prospect of strong airlines such as Singapore Airlines seizing on those
rights (since Singapore is a party to MALIAT). Id. at 439.
65 Tan, supra note 22, at 450.
66 Tan, supra note 22, at 449.
67 See generally IAN THOMAS & ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, CTR. FOR ASIA PACIFIC AVIA-
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SIA cannot replicate British Airways' sixth freedom network
from the latter's home turf, while British Airways could possibly
replicate SIA's from Singapore.
To add to these constraints, it is not altogether clear if a Sin-
gapore carrier will be able to enjoy unlimited access to the intra-
European market. It may well be that with the conclusion of an
open aviation agreement between Singapore and the E.U., Sin-
gapore carriers can either have unlimited fifth and seventh free-
dom privileges within the E.U., or have the right to establish a
(wholly-owned) subsidiary to service intra-E.U. routes.68 Cur-
rently, these scenarios are not possible within the terms of the
Singapore-E.U. "horizontal" agreement. Taking a page from
the U.S. book, the E.U. may well treat such routes as "cabotage"
operations that are not open to non-E.U. carriers. In that event,
hubbing operations out of an E.U. airport may not be so attrac-
tive after all. This will only heighten the imbalance between
what carriers from both regions can or cannot do in the other's
backyard.
The other (and more significant) development is the impend-
ing consolidation of E.U. carriers into several merged entities.
With the widespread acceptance of the "community carrier"
clause, mergers and acquisitions among E.U. carriers are made
possible, without prejudice to the carriers' rights to fly to third
states. Clearly, the Air France-KLM and Lufthansa-Swiss mergers
mark only the beginning of a comprehensive overhaul of the
European airline industry. Indeed, other candidates for merger
have appeared on the horizon, notably Alitalia and Iberia.69
Third states that sign "horizontal" agreements as well as states
that go on to conclude future open aviation agreements with
the E.U. will see their carriers facing competition from stronger
E.U. carriers able to draw capital injections and management
control from across the entire European Community. Hence,
the concern lies not so much with additional competition by nu-
merous E.U. carriers on individual routes, but with merged E.U.
68 Even if the Singapore carrier was permitted to do these options, the market
wisdom of doing so is doubtful, given the tremendous competition from low-cost
carriers plying intra-E.U. routes.
69 The Air France-KLM group is making a bid to buy Alitalia. See Air France-
KLM-Iberia: Is Merger the Future of Alliances?, AIRLINE WORLD, July 17, 2007, http://
airlineworld.wordpress.com/2007/07/17/air-france-km-iberia-is-merger-the-
future-of-alliances/; Alitalia Board Opts for Air France-KLM, FIN. TIMES (Europe),
Dec. 22, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 25241193.
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carriers posing competitive challenges arising from fleet size,
multiple network hubbing, and unit cost advantages.
For their part, Asian carriers typically cannot benefit from for-
eign equity infusions (beyond forty-nine percent) or outright
mergers with other carriers because of the foreign ownership
and control restrictions in place between most countries. There
is thus a critical need for Asian countries to begin liberalizing
aviation relations among themselves so as to better meet the com-
petitive forces emerging from outside the region. Asian coun-
tries need to liberalize not only by granting more generous fifth
and seventh freedom rights for each other's carriers (so as to
facilitate multiple hubbing within the region), but also by re-
laxing foreign ownership and control restrictions in the coun-
tries' respective bilateral agreements with one another.
Nevertheless, there have been some developments suggesting
that the protectionism characterizing government regulation of
aviation in Asia is eroding, albeit slowly. In Southeast Asia, for
instance, the ten member countries of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations ("ASEAN") have committed themselves to es-
tablishing a single aviation market by the year 2015.70 Whether
this goal is at all realistic is debatable-government protection
of national carriers is still widespread in ASEAN, and officials
appear to be looking in the direction of unlimited third/fourth
freedom rights within the region, as opposed to more liberal
fifth or seventh freedom rights. In Northeast Asia, there has
been talk of establishing a trilateral common market among
China, Japan, and Korea.7' Not surprisingly, the Koreans-with
their small market but efficient airlines-are the strongest pro-
ponents of the idea.7 2 China and Japan remain cool to the idea,
70 See Joint Ministerial Statement, 13th ASEAN Transport Ministers (ATM)
Meeting, Singapore, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.aseansec.org/21006.htm.
71 See Katsuhiro Yamaguchi & Yuichiro Yoshida, Liberalization in North East
Asian Skies-Theory and Case Study of Tri-partite Market Liberalization, Address
at the 2nd International Seminar of the International Transport Policy Research
Unit (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ITPU/seminar/2007-03-02/.
For an overview, see Tae Hoon Oum & Yeong Heok Lee, The Northeast Asian Air
Transport Network: Is There a Possibility of Creating Open Skies in the Region ?, 8 J. AjR
TRANSP. MGMT. 325 (2002).
72 See id. at 328. The President of Korean Air has even publicly proposed an
aviation bloc among China, Japan, and Korea. See Korean Air Proposes East Asia
Bloc to Counter EU Inroads, ABC MONEY, Jan. 17, 2007, http://www.abcmoney.co.
uk/news/ 1720077034.htm.
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and appear content to pursue bilateral relaxations at their own
pace.7"
Overall, there is some momentum toward internal liberaliza-
tion within Asia, but this is largely due to the governments' rela-
tive tolerance of low-cost carriers ("LCCs"). Malaysian-owned
AirAsia, in particular, has pioneered the model of setting up
overseas joint ventures in Thailand and Indonesia in which it
holds minority stakes (typically forty-nine percent), with major-
ity ownership residing in local hands." Its subsidiaries, Thai
AirAsia and Indonesia AirAsia, are legally distinct from the par-
ent carrier, are majority-owned by Thai and Indonesian inter-
ests, and are run by their own boards. They operate
international routes using the rights contained in Thailand's
and Indonesia's respective bilateral air services agreements with
other countries.
Similarly, Singapore-based Jetstar Asia is majority-owned by
Singaporean interests, but the carrier is part of the Australian
national carrier Qantas's Jetstar brand.75 Additionally, there is
Tiger Airways, set up by Singapore Airlines, which has firm plans
to establish operations in South Korea and the Philippines using
the same model. 76 All these entities are thus scrupulously faith-
ful to the "substantial ownership" rule found in the region's bi-
lateral air services agreements, but whether their "effective
control" truly lies at home is debatable. In each of these in-
stances, the local majority owners are typically non-airline inter-
ests with no or minimal experience in the aviation industry.7 7
The marketing and branding strategy is standardized across the
numerous units. Thai AirAsia and Indonesia AirAsia, for in-
stance, have virtually indistinguishable identities with their com-
73 See Oum & Lee, supra note 71, at 326, 329.
74 See Air Asia, Company Profile: The Story So Far, http://www.airasia.com
(last visited May 12, 2008).
75 Qantas owns 44.5% of Orangestar, the holding company that owns Jetstar
Asia. Competition Commission Singapore, Qantas & Orangestar Co-operation
Agreement (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.ccs.gov.sg/PublicRegister/ND+Qantas+
Orangestar.htm.
76 Chan Sue Ling & Haslinda Amin, Tiger Airways Plans More Bases Overseas,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 3, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 17101007; Lin Xinyi,
Tiger Air to Set Up Base in S. Korea, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 6, 2007, availa-
ble at 2007 WLNR 21849388.
77 Nevertheless, each entity has a CEO distinct from the "parent" carrier's and
a separate governing board made up of local directors in the majority.
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mon red-and-white livery and a shared internet booking
platform with the parent AirAsia in Malaysia.78
Yet the national governments in these countries do not ap-
pear to have a problem with the arrangement, as long as major-
ity ownership remains with local interests. 79 Nor have bilateral
partners protested over any perceived lack of "effective control."
Crucially, this operational model has allowed the parent carriers
to establish multiple hubs and operations across Asia, simultane-
ously by-passing ownership/control and seventh freedom/hub-
bing restrictions.
Does this signify a new thinking to liberalization, or is it sim-
ply a pragmatic response by Asian governments to deal with the
new phenomenon of LCCs? The reality is that these LCC ar-
rangements are defacto relaxations to the ownership and control
regime.8 0 At the same time, the momentum for further liberali-
zation within the Asian region is undeniable. Further, the indi-
vidual countries' keenness to engage the E.U. (and the United
States) for open aviation agreements cannot but register the
point that internal liberalization within Asia, and among Asian
countries, is inevitable. The consequences of inaction will be-
come particularly evident when the E.U. completes its grand
agenda of unifying its member states' external aviation policy,
and the competitive pressure exerted by E.U. carriers is felt all
across Asia. In addition, the mood for liberalization within Asia
will grow once major markets like China and India decide to
open up, both to partners outside and within the region. The
rest of the continent will have little choice but to follow suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
The European Commission's relentless move to seal "horizon-
tal" agreements with third states, taken together with individual
E.U. member states' offering greater access for third state carri-
ers, will inevitably lead to more Asian countries accepting the
"carrots" coming their way. In time, this will lead to the conclu-
sion of fully liberal open aviation agreements between third
states and a unified Europe, with the latter increasingly negotiat-
ing and behaving like the United States on the aviation stage.
Within the Asian region, a growing number of countries-led by
78 See Welcome to airasia.com, http://www.airasia.com (last visited May 12,
2008).
79 THOMAS & TAN, supra note 67, at 24.
80 Id.
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Singapore-are showing interest in liberalizing aviation rela-
tions with the E.U., though not as a negotiating bloc, and not
even among themselves.
The consequence is a looming imbalance in the aero-political
equation between European and Asian carriers, notjust in terms
of fifth and seventh freedom/hubbing rights in the region but
also in relation to opportunities for equity infusions and merg-
ers across boundaries. Thus, while an E.U. carrier will conceiva-
bly be able to establish multiple hubs in both Europe and Asia,
an Asian carrier will, somewhat ironically, be limited to hubs in
Europe. In addition, while E.U. carriers can merge and become
stronger with Community-wide capital injections, Asian carriers
continue to labor under restrictive foreign ownership and con-
trol conditions.
All these will have a far-reaching impact on the competitive
positions of Asian carriers, as they face stronger, leaner, and bet-
ter-capitalized European competitors in the years to come. Yet,
a tipping point will arrive when Asian governments realize the
disadvantages of failing to liberalize within their region. Cer-
tainly, this moment may not davin so soon, and there will be
protectionist elements holding out and resisting. For now, the
agreements that tiny Singapore has signed with the E.U. and the
U.K. may seem relatively innocuous in effect, but they are with-
out a doubt a harbinger of interesting times to come.
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